The Encyclopedia of Comparative Jurisprudence and Law

The present study comparatively examines the impact of artificial sleep (hypnosis) and the use of narcotic drugs on the legal classification of homicide (intentional, semi-intentional, and pure error) within the Iranian criminal justice system. The significance of this research lies in the fact that both conditions—by disrupting an individual’s consciousness and will—can alter the legal characterization of a homicide offense. Given the sensitivity of homicide in Iran’s legal and jurisprudential framework and its close association with criminal justice, it is essential to analyze the psychological, neurological, and legal dimensions of these phenomena. This study employs a descriptive–analytical and comparative approach. Data were collected through a comprehensive review of jurisprudential sources, Iranian criminal law (particularly Articles 153 and 290 of the Islamic Penal Code), and findings from neuroscience and psychology. The results indicate that both hypnosis and narcotic substances lead to a reduction in the level of consciousness and a partial or complete dissolution of free will. In hypnosis, due to the involuntary nature of suggestion and the absence of independent intent, Article 153 of the Islamic Penal Code can be invoked to grant full exemption from criminal responsibility. However, in the case of narcotic substances, because their consumption is typically voluntary, criminal liability generally remains intact. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances—such as severe intoxication or drug-induced hallucination—the classification of homicide may shift to semi-intentional or pure error. The fundamental distinction is that artificial sleep possesses a scientific–therapeutic dimension, whereas drug use is intertwined with broad social consequences, including addiction and criminal behavior. The findings suggest that Iranian criminal law adopts a more flexible stance toward hypnosis while maintaining a strict policy toward narcotic substances. This contrast reflects the legislator’s effort to balance the preservation of public order with the pursuit of criminal justice. Conducting such studies can contribute to enriching the literature of criminal law and enhancing judicial practice.

One of the most significant political, social, and legal concerns of modern states that has become a major issue in the field of human rights is the question of refugee protection. In the realm of international law, numerous instruments have been adopted to safeguard the rights of refugees, and many states have accepted the obligations arising from these conventions. Among them, Iran and Iraq are considered key host countries for refugees in the Middle East. The presence of millions of refugees-mostly from Syria and Afghanistan-has intensified debates over their civil rights and legal protections. Although both countries have acceded to several relevant international instruments and have introduced certain domestic regulations to address refugee issues, challenges such as ambiguity regarding the legal status of refugees, discrimination in the enjoyment of social and economic rights, and the lack of alignment between domestic laws and international standards have hindered the full realization of refugees’ civil rights. This paper seeks to answer the key question of What are the differences and shortcomings of the Iranian and Iraqi legal systems in ensuring the civil, social, and economic rights of refugees, and how can their situation be improved through legal reforms and enhanced international cooperation? The study adopts a descriptive–analytical method and concludes that the effective realization of refugees’ civil rights requires comprehensive legal reforms, strengthened international cooperation, and the adoption of universal human rights standards in both Iran and Iraq.

The central question of the present study is whether the rule of La-Zarar (“no harm and no harassment”) can serve as a legal basis for claiming damages arising from the dissolution of an engagement (namzadi) under Iranian law, and how the Civil Code and jurisprudential interpretations—particularly the opinion of Imam Khomeini—offer guidance on this matter. The significance of this topic lies in the absence of an explicit legal provision concerning compensation for material and moral damages caused by the annulment or termination of an engagement. This legal gap has consistently led to divergent judicial practices and uncertainty for the aggrieved party. A correct interpretation of the La-Zarar rule and its proper application can fill important gaps in ensuring fairness and preventing irreparable harm between the parties. Using an analytical-comparative approach, this study first examines the relevant provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 1035–1040) and the jurisprudential texts related to the La-Zarar principle, with a particular focus on the opinions of Imam Khomeini. It then critiques the existing approaches and interpretations. The overall findings of the research indicate that the La-Zarar rule, both in Islamic jurisprudence and in Iranian statutory law, can be invoked as a legitimate basis for compensating certain damages resulting from the breaking of an engagement, provided that the harm is extraordinary and provable.

The theoretical tradition of justice within the liberal discourse has consistently sought to reconcile its commitment to negative freedoms with the institutional requirements of justice, leading to multiple interpretations of the relationship among the individual, the state, and power. These range from libertarian defenses of the most minimal form of public authority to theories such as justice as fairness (Rawls) or the capability approach (Sen), both of which call for a redefinition of the state’s mission to ensure equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, the question of whether justice can be realized within the framework of the minimal state—as an institutional form of limiting political authority—remains one of the most intricate theoretical controversies in liberal public law. This study, grounded in the conceptual framework of liberal theories of justice and through a comparative analysis of the institutional experiences of the United States and the United Kingdom, seeks to identify mechanisms capable of realizing justice as both an institutional and distributive matter within the structures of a minimal state. The analysis reveals that the central challenge lies not in the magnitude of state authority but in the quality of its architecture; reducing justice to a merely negative concept effectively suspends the duty of solidarity within the public order. The findings indicate that a small state, if guided by justice-oriented rationality and intelligent institutional design, is not inherently in conflict with justice but can instead embody novel capacities for its realization. This research, conducted using a descriptive–analytical method, outlines a conceptual horizon for reconstructing the compatibility of freedom and justice in contemporary public law.

The right to upbringing is considered one of the most fundamental rights of the child—a right whose realization depends on healthy, balanced, and appropriate education that meets the child’s physical, psychological, and emotional needs. The purpose of such upbringing is the flourishing of human potential and the attainment of the lofty ends envisioned by the Divine Lawgiver for humankind. Among the various instruments of upbringing, discipline constitutes a crucial yet delicate responsibility entrusted to parents. However, the authority to discipline is not absolute; rather, it is bound by rules, criteria, and conditions that ensure its legitimacy. One of the most significant among these is the criterion of observing the child’s welfare in the disciplinary process. Any form of punishment or discipline that exceeds the limits of reason and religious law, or that is motivated by anger, revenge, or ill will—thereby endangering the child’s higher interests—lacks legitimacy and renders the disciplining party liable. Accordingly, the welfare criterion occupies a fundamental position in legitimizing parental disciplinary actions, and adherence to it is a necessary condition for the disciplinarian to be absolved of liability. In the present study, using a documentary–library method and within a descriptive–analytical framework based on content analysis, the foundational concepts of “criterion,” “welfare,” “discipline,” and “punishment” are examined in both linguistic and jurisprudential–legal contexts. Subsequently, by employing authoritative sources in Imami jurisprudence and legal texts, the formal and substantive indicators and standards for assessing the child’s welfare in matters of discipline and punishment are derived. Due to their general and comprehensive nature, these indicators may be applied to various child-related legal issues, including the topic under discussion. Finally, the study proposes a framework for identifying the greater welfare (“maslahat aham”) based on religious and jurisprudential foundations, which may serve as a legal and jurisprudential basis for evaluating the legitimacy of disciplinary actions and resolving related liabilities.

Dejudicialization is one of the most significant issues that has occupied the minds of criminal law scholars, particularly in light of the increasing criminal population. Criminal prosecution is a dual-faceted process that, on one hand, relates to the rights and freedoms of individuals in society, and on the other hand, concerns public order and security. The adjudication and resolution of disputes arising from criminal offenses generally fall within the jurisdiction of judicial authorities. Dejudicialization refers to the removal of adjudication and dispute resolution operations from the formal criminal proceedings process. The implementation of such dejudicialization may vary across different legal systems. The emergence of new conditions and exigencies has compelled criminal law to observe new issues and regulations in order to align with contemporary perspectives in judicial procedures. Among these are the fundamental principles governing punishments, which require criminal law to adopt and follow new approaches consistent with these principles. The present article aims to examine the theoretical foundations of dejudicialization and its instances within Iranian criminal law, as well as to identify the positive functions of dejudicialization within the judiciary. Methodologically, the study is applied in purpose and relies on a documentary research method through the examination of laws and authoritative sources. The collected data have been analyzed using a descriptive-analytical approach. Based on the findings, it can be concluded that dejudicialization reduces the heavy burden placed on the judicial system and decreases the volume of incoming cases to the courts. Ultimately, it facilitates the realization of justice in a simpler, more economical, and consequently fairer manner.

Today, given the complexity of crimes, the responsibility of judges in adjudicating and issuing verdicts holds exceptional sensitivity. Judges are entrusted with protecting the life, property, and honor of citizens, and even the slightest negligence or error can lead to significant material and moral damages—or even deprive a person of their right to life. Until the first half of the twentieth century, judges possessed absolute authority in issuing judgments, and it was commonly assumed that they enjoyed a form of immunity. However, this situation did not persist, as emerging intellectual movements challenged this assumption and gradually succeeded in enacting legal provisions to address judicial errors or misconduct. As a result, most contemporary legal systems around the world—regardless of their structural differences—have accepted the principle of compensating for judicial errors. In the Iranian legal system, it is stipulated that if a judge’s fault in issuing an erroneous judgment is proven, he is responsible for compensating the resulting damages. The competence to determine such fault lies with the Prosecutor’s Office and the Judicial Disciplinary Court. The foundations of this principle are rooted in Qur’anic verses, narrations, and established rules in Imamiyyah jurisprudence—such as the principles of la darar (no harm) and tasbib (causation)—all of which share the common emphasis on the necessity of compensating damages. In light of Article 171 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the legislator has formally recognized the principle of compensation and the liability of both the state and judges in the case of judicial errors. Furthermore, Article 58 of the Islamic Penal Code (ratified in 1991 CE) reiterates and reinforces the provisions of this principle.

Natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, storms, droughts, and wildfires force millions of people around the world to leave their homes every year, resulting in the phenomenon of internal forced displacement. This displacement is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges facing the contemporary world. According to the Global Report of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2025), there is a record number of more than 83 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide, a significant portion of which is attributed to natural disasters. Many internally displaced persons, due to being uprooted from their habitual residences, are often highly vulnerable individuals who find themselves in long-term situations of fragility, dependency, and legal insecurity. They frequently face either a lack of opportunity or active deprivation of the means to rebuild their lives. In the absence of adequate and effective protection of their human rights, they may even, in certain cases, become exposed to international crimes. Given the vulnerability of internally displaced persons, this article provides a comprehensive examination of the concept of internal displacement in the context of natural disasters, focusing on the impacts of this phenomenon on vulnerable individuals, the legal obligations of states to protect them, and international legal frameworks such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) and the Kampala Convention (2009). It further analyzes the human rights protection gaps and the challenges of implementing state obligations in this regard, and proposes recommendations to enhance protection mechanisms. The study is developed through a human rights–based approach, grounded in international legal instruments and United Nations reports.