The Encyclopedia of Comparative Jurisprudence and Law

Women's right to procreate is one of the fundamental concepts in contemporary legal, moral, and social discourses that is at the intersection of individual autonomy, reproductive health, and cultural and religious structures. This article aims to comparative study women's right to procreate from the perspective of Islamic legal school and the feminist movement, and attempts to present a multi-layered picture of this right by analyzing theoretical concepts, examining reliable sources, and assessing legal and ethical challenges. In this study, the concept of procreate is first defined comprehensively and then analyzed from the perspective of human rights, individual rights, and bioethics. Next, the position of women in Islamic legal school is examined with reference to contemporary jurisprudential, interpretative, and fatwa sources, and in contrast, the diverse views of the feminist movement on bodily autonomy, freedom of choice, and criticism of patriarchal structures are analyzed. The comparative analysis section of the article examines the similarities and differences between the two perspectives in areas such as women's independence in decision-making, the role of the family and the state, and special circumstances such as celibacy or artificial insemination, and reveals the legal and ethical challenges of each approach. The findings of the article show that both perspectives, despite their epistemological differences, have the potential for dialogue and convergence in supporting women's dignity and their right to choose in the field of reproduction. The research method in this article is descriptive-analytical and based on library studies and reliable scientific sources, and an attempt has been made to present a written and defensible text by observing the principle of emulation.

In the current global economic climate, competitiveness is a determining factor in the economic sustainability and political stability of countries. Economic dynamism is not only an economic necessity, but also a prerequisite for maintaining national independence and security. In the meantime, foreign investment, as one of the efficient tools for economic growth and development, has found a special place in the legal and economic systems of countries. With the spread of ideas based on the doctrine of free trade and the globalization of markets, the importance of respecting the principle of freedom of will and the sovereignty of the will of the parties in shaping the rights and obligations arising from foreign investment has become more and more apparent. However, the Iranian legal system faces fundamental challenges in dealing with the concepts of "capital", "investor" and "foreign investment". Ambiguity in legal definitions, fragmentation of regulations and lack of full compliance of domestic concepts with internationally accepted standards have led to disagreements in the interpretation and implementation of investment contracts. Moreover, the emergence of new forms of investment contracts, including public-private partnerships, cross-selling, and indirect investments, requires a review of the traditional frameworks of legal analysis of these institutions. This article, with an analytical-critical approach, examines the conceptual and substantive challenges related to the definitions of capital, investor, and foreign investment in the Iranian legal system. Based on a comparative comparison with international practices and documents, it attempts to identify the conceptual and structural gaps in the Foreign Investment Promotion and Support Law and provide solutions for adapting it to the needs of the contemporary economy and the requirements of international interactions.

The challenges associated with default judgments in Iranian civil proceedings, viewed through the dual lenses of Imamiyyah jurisprudence and statutory law, constitute a critical issue for ensuring judicial fairness and the protection of litigants’ rights. This article, focusing on Article 303 of the Iranian Civil Procedure Code, analyzes the jurisprudential and legal foundations of issuing a default judgment, as well as the necessary conditions for doing so—including the absence of the defendant, the lack of a written defense, and the absence of actual service of notice. First, the concept of non-appearance in litigation and its limitations within Imamiyyah jurisprudence is examined, clarifying the distinction between provisional decisions and final judgments. Next, the fundamental principles of fair trial and the right to access justice are elaborated, emphasizing their role in preventing violations of the parties’ rights. The article also explores the adversarial principle in adjudication and its significance in ensuring equality and the possibility of defense for both parties, supported by historical review and legal documentation. Furthermore, the study addresses existing ambiguities in the conditions for issuing default judgments, including the requirement of a written defense and actual service of notice, and examines the role of submitting a power of attorney or a counterclaim in removing the label of a default judgment. Finally, the article discusses challenges related to requiring a guarantor or security from the judgment creditor in default judgments and highlights differences between this requirement and established jurisprudential and legal principles. The findings indicate that the overlap between statutory provisions, jurisprudential reasoning, and judicial practice has generated uncertainty in distinguishing between default and adversarial judgments, demonstrating that precise analysis of their conditions and evidentiary foundations is essential for realizing a fair trial.

The principle of contractual bindingness (pacta sunt servanda) constitutes a core foundation of private law and transactional order, yet its conceptual basis and practical consequences vary across legal systems. This narrative review comparatively examines the doctrine of binding force in Imami jurisprudence, Iranian law, and the French legal system, while analyzing the central role of the modern doctrine of good faith. In Imami jurisprudence, contractual bindingness is grounded in scriptural evidence, rational principles, and ethical norms such as honesty, trustworthiness, and the prohibition of deception, with khiyārāt serving as corrective mechanisms that prevent rigid or unjust enforcement. Iranian contract law, reflected primarily in Civil Code Articles 219–224, adopts these jurisprudential foundations and reinforces bindingness through judicial practice that generally interprets rescission narrowly. In contrast, following the 2016 reform, French contract law transformed its classical will-based model by elevating good faith into an explicit and general obligation under Article 1104, thereby redefining bindingness through cooperation, transparency, and contractual fairness. The three-way comparison reveals a shared commitment to contractual stability but significant divergence in the normative and functional role of good faith: implicit in Imami jurisprudence, fragmented in Iranian law, and fully explicit and mandatory in French law. The study concludes that leveraging the ethical depth of Imami jurisprudence and the doctrinal advances of French law can support the systematic integration of good faith into Iranian contract law and enhance both fairness and efficiency in contractual relations.

Among the most essential human needs throughout life are financial needs. Without considering such needs, life cannot endure. This has caused human beings throughout history to devote the utmost effort and diligence to economic activities. Islam has affirmed these activities with great clarity, referring to them as a form of sacred struggle. In Islamic teachings, the ultimate aim of economic activity is attaining closeness to God and seeking His pleasure. In this regard, the well-being of the family, the individual, and society is oriented toward social justice and genuine equity. This study, using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on Islamic jurisprudential sources, seeks to examine the foundations of disrupting the economic system from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. In the Holy Qur’an, the notion of mufsid fi al-arz (one who spreads corruption on earth) is mentioned repeatedly; however, it has not explicitly been designated as the subject of a specific criminal sanction. In this study, using a descriptive-analytical approach, we examine efsād fi al-arz as the punishment assigned to the crime of disrupting the economic system in Islamic jurisprudential sources, given that Iranian law is derived from jurisprudence and its basis and foundation lie in Islamic teachings, which is reflected in legislation. The aim of this research is to determine whether, according to jurisprudential texts, there is proportionality between the committed act, the criminal designation assigned to it, and the punishment prescribed. Criminalizing efsād fi al-arz as an offense independent from mohārebeh (armed rebellion) and prescribing the death penalty for it appears to be somewhat illogical within criminal law, because first, the term efsād fi al-arz has not been independently discussed in classical jurisprudential texts, and jurists have addressed it under the category of mohārebeh. Moreover, the argument asserting that there must be a necessary correspondence between the establishment of Sharīʿa rulings and their explicit designation in the wording of jurists is not compelling.

The purpose of this research is to examine the concept of the necessity of transformation of the action and the conditions for its realization in order to permit third-party impleader at the appellate stage, with a comparative study of French law. One of the incidental actions involving a third party is the action for third-party impleader. In a third-party impleader action, one of the litigants, based on certain reasons and interests, determines that a third person must be summoned into the case. The plaintiff or defendant who summons the third party is called the “impleading party,” and the third person is called the “impleaded party.” By bringing an impleader action at the appellate stage, the impleaded third party does not have the opportunity to lodge an objection or file an appeal of their own, and the judgment rendered at the appellate stage becomes final. In comparing this subject with third-party intervention at the appellate stage, it should be noted that an intervening third party voluntarily joins the action and, in effect, accepts that the adjudication of their claim will proceed in only one instance at the appellate level, and that the judgment becomes final thereafter. However, no such voluntary intent exists in the case of the impleaded party, and this constitutes one of the deficiencies of allowing impleader at the appellate stage. Moreover, this practice contradicts the principle of adversarial procedure and the equality of the parties’ right of defense. In addition, given the compelled presence of the third party during appellate proceedings, the impleaded party has no right to object to the judgment after it is issued. This legal possibility may be abused, as the impleading party might intentionally submit a third-party impleader petition at the appellate stage in order to deprive the third party of their appellate and defensive rights. One measure to prevent such misuse is to restrict the possibility of impleader by creating specific conditions, such as the emergence of a new element stemming from the trial court’s judgment or arising after its issuance. For this reason, French law has restricted this possibility, and third-party impleader cannot be raised absolutely at the appellate level. According to Article 555 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, “these persons (third parties) may be summoned before the court of appeal when the transformation of the action entails that they be made a party, even for the purpose of securing a judgment against them” (Code de procédure civile, 1975). Thus, there must be an intention to transform the action, and such transformation must necessitate the impleader of the third party. Transformation of the action occurs when circumstances arise in which new facts regarding a right or an act are discovered. Nevertheless, the French Court of Cassation, based on the principle of two degrees of jurisdiction, has limited the initiation of third-party impleader at the appellate stage.

Civil liability is the responsibility that arises when damage is inflicted, requiring the party causing the harm to compensate for it. Civil liability signifies the obligation to pay compensation for losses. Based on the principle of civil liability, a specific relationship is formed between the injurer and the injured party, namely the obligation to compensate for the damage. Therefore, civil liability in its broad and general sense encompasses both contractual and non-contractual liability, since in both cases the central issue concerns compensation for losses. The objective of the present study is to examine the methods of compensating damages in force majeure events, considering the role of the state in Iranian and American law. Providing a precise definition of natural disasters is difficult due to the numerous examples, each with different characteristics. It appears that for an event to be classified as a natural disaster, it must be unforeseeable, unavoidable, and not attributable to any party. The findings of this study indicate that the civil liability of the state in natural disasters constitutes a collective responsibility; it is the responsibility of human beings toward one another, with the state acting as an intermediary in this regard. In the occurrence of force majeure events and natural disasters, negligence and failure in preventive measures, as well as deficiencies in the enforcement of laws, in some cases impose civil liability on public officials and service institutions, obligating them to compensate for resulting losses. In the American legal system, the principle of full compensation for damages is recognized.

This article examines Iran’s criminal policy regarding customs crimes and offenses. The country’s criminal policies in this area have undergone significant transformations over the years, influenced by economic, social, and international developments. One of the main objectives of this study is to analyze the existing laws in this field, including the Law on Combating Smuggling of Goods and Foreign Exchange (2013) and the Customs Affairs Law (2011), as well as to identify their implementation challenges and obstacles. Using a library-based and descriptive–analytical method, this study analyzes the relevant laws and policies aimed at combating goods smuggling and customs violations, and ultimately assesses the performance of the institutions involved in this domain. The findings indicate that, despite the enactment of multiple laws and legal reforms intended to counter smuggling and customs offenses, significant challenges persist in enforcement and supervision. These challenges primarily arise from the lack of coordination among various institutions, the ambiguity in distinguishing between customs violations and crimes, and the administrative complexities associated with precise implementation of the law. Moreover, the imposition of severe penalties without adequate consideration of the specific characteristics of each offense or crime has, in some cases, resulted in adverse economic and social consequences. Finally, this article emphasizes the necessity of legislative and administrative reforms to enhance the efficiency of Iran’s criminal policy in addressing customs-related crimes.