Explication and Analysis of the Distinction Between Criminal Liability Arising from Causation in Crime and Tasbib in Homicide in Islamic Jurisprudence and Statutory Law

Abstract

In contemporary criminal law, various modes of involvement and influence by individuals in the commission of crimes and the realization of their criminal outcomes are defined. Among these, in offenses against bodily integrity—commonly referred to in the jurisprudential literature as jināyāt (homicide or bodily crimes)—a particular mode of contribution known as “tasbib in homicide” is emphasized. In other categories of offenses, particularly in taʿzīr crimes, another type of participation or role-playing is recognized, conventionally termed “causation (sababiyyat) in crime.” Although criminal liability arising from both modes originates from the same foundational principles—namely restitution, and the principles of equity and justice—the two diverge in scope and operative mechanisms. This divergence stems from the fact that the domain of influence in causation in crime encompasses a broader range of circumstances compared to tasbib in homicide. Additionally, in tasbib in homicide, no other human agent besides the individual ultimately held criminally liable plays a direct role in producing the harmful and criminal outcome. By contrast, in causation in crime, there is typically another human intermediary between the cause and the harmful criminal result; however, that intermediary—due to lack of independent knowledge, will, or because his or her will is overpowered—is not deemed criminally responsible. Accordingly, this article seeks to explore the multiple dimensions of the topic through an exploratory, descriptive, and analytical method, examining the distinctions between these two modes of involvement and the resulting criminal liability for both natural and legal persons, as well as their differing legal consequences. The findings aim to contribute to the scholarship of criminal law researchers and to inform future legislative developments.