Discretionary Punishments Under the Scrutiny of Postmodernist Propositions

Abstract

Prior to the emergence of the postmodernist school of thought, the positivist or empirical approach had already introduced criminology as a science concerned with the causation of criminal phenomena. From 1876 CE, when criminology was shaped under such an approach, until the 1950s, criminologists viewed the criminal phenomenon through a singular lens. Consequently, the only distinction in their intellectual contributions was a shift in the seasonal backdrop of their observations, while the observed scene remained constant. Eventually, however, voices from behind the intellectual edifice of criminology compelled them to dismantle the walls and transcend dogmatism and unidimensional perspectives. The examination of postmodern criminologists’ viewpoints and the functionality and efficacy of discretionary punishments from their perspective is largely a matter of relativistic interpretation, which significantly complicates the analysis. For instance, postmodernism holds that in class-based societies, or those structurally embedded with racism, sexism, colonialism, and exploitation—what Durkheim termed “mechanical societies”—crime and criminal behavior may be viewed as socially functional and even innovative. Within such a framework, the primary blame and responsibility for criminal acts is often attributed to the state and governing authorities themselves. In contrast, in societies where governance upholds human dignity and recognizes the four generations of human rights, it is untenable to assign any constructive utility to crime or criminal behavior, nor is it justifiable to hold governments accountable for the commission of such crimes.