Identification and Classification of the Forms and Instances of Disruption of Public Order in Statutory and Interpretive Legal Texts

Abstract

Public order is a fundamental yet inherently flexible concept in criminal law, the scope of which directly affects both the legitimate boundaries of state penal intervention and the protection of individual freedoms. The conceptual ambiguity of public order and the legislature’s use of expressions such as “uproar and commotion,” “unconventional conduct,” and “assault against individuals” have made it difficult to distinguish merely unconventional behavior or limited nuisance from criminal disruption of public order. This study aims to identify and classify the forms and instances of disruption of public order in statutory and interpretive legal texts through a descriptive-analytical method. The findings indicate that Article 618 of the Islamic Penal Code constitutes the principal statutory basis for the direct criminalization of disruption of public order and that its structure is based on the combination of specified forms of conduct and the occurrence of a public disruptive consequence. Accordingly, uproar, unconventional conduct, or assault alone is insufficient to establish the offense; the conduct must actually disrupt public order, comfort, or tranquility, or prevent people from carrying on their business activities. Moreover, offenses addressed in other statutory provisions that are related to public order and tranquility contain distinct legal elements and should not automatically be regarded as instances of Article 618. Analysis of statutory and interpretive materials supports a four-dimensional classification based on the nature of the conduct, the type of disruptive consequence, the scope and intensity of the disruption, and the mode of commission. Factors such as the number and range of persons affected, duration of the conduct, degree of interference with the ordinary functioning of the environment, obstruction of traffic, interruption of economic activities, and creation of public fear or anxiety may therefore assist in determining whether the criminal threshold has been reached. The study concludes that the principal deficiency is not the absence of an exhaustive list of disruptive acts, but the lack of sufficiently clear criteria for distinguishing criminal disruption of public order from undesirable behavior, limited nuisance, and private disputes.