A Comparative Study of the Impact of Duress on the Determination of Criminal Liability in Iranian and English Law

Abstract

Criminal liability in contemporary legal systems is not based solely on the commission of the material element of an offense; rather, the existence of volition, freedom of choice, awareness, and psychological imputability to the offender also plays a fundamental role in establishing such liability. Whenever an individual’s free will is eliminated or effectively restricted due to factors such as insanity, perceptual impairment, sleep, unconsciousness, intoxication, compulsion, or severe duress, the basis for criminal attribution is likewise undermined. Using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, the present article examines the effects of volition and duress on criminal liability in Iranian and English law. The findings indicate that Iranian law, drawing on concepts such as reason, intent, knowledge, and free choice, regards the absence or impairment of volition as one of the most significant impediments to criminal liability; however, in regulating the legal consequences of duress, it adopts a differentiated approach across hudud, qisas, diyat, and ta'zir offenses. By contrast, English law, through a precise distinction among involuntary conduct, insanity, intoxication, diminished responsibility, and prior fault, provides a more detailed analysis of situations involving the loss of voluntary control. It is concluded that both legal systems regard the absence of free will as an important basis for excluding or mitigating criminal liability; nevertheless, English law offers a more detailed and systematically structured framework in terms of the classification of defenses and the determination of the appropriate criminal-law response. Finally, the article emphasizes the need to reconsider the legislative framework in Iranian law and to distinguish more precisely among intermediate states of impaired volition.