Iran's Criminal Policy Toward Economic Disruption with Emphasis on the Scapegoat Theory

Abstract

Disruption in economic crimes is one of the criminal topics in Iranian criminal law that is subject to ambiguity and various interpretations. Accordingly, the aim of this article is to examine the question: How can Iran's criminal policy toward economic disruption be analyzed with an emphasis on the scapegoat theory? This is a descriptive-analytical article that employs a library-based method to address the aforementioned question. The findings indicate that Iran’s criminal policy is predominantly a security-oriented penal policy, attempting to portray itself as powerful, whereas the true strength of the system and penal policy lies in crime prevention. In reality, the state, by sacrificing a scapegoat, seeks to influence public opinion with the notion that it possesses sufficient authority to confront offenders. The fact of the matter is that in the context of economic disruption, the multiplicity and proliferation of criminal labels—driven by pragmatism—undermine economic development, as they cause confusion and fear of prosecution among investors due to the abundance of legal provisions, leading them to hesitation; whereas adherence to clear and transparent laws fosters trust and encourages investment. Furthermore, the notion of growth and development is meaningless without consideration for judicial security. This can only be achieved when fundamental principles such as the independence of the judiciary, judicial independence, and timely adjudication are taken into account. However, in many instances, populist approaches and practices based on the scapegoat theory lead to the neglect of these principles.