Comparative Study of the Validity and Functions of Mafhūm Mukhālafah (Argument from the Opposite Meaning) in Legal Systems: From Islamic Jurisprudence to Foreign Law
Keywords:
logical reasoning, causal relationship, literal interpretation, negation of the qualifier (intifāʾ al-qayd), rational validityAbstract
In Islamic jurisprudence, the concept of mafḥūm mukhālafah (argument from the opposite meaning) appears in several forms, such as condition (sharṭ), description (waṣf), epithet (laqab), number (ʿadad), restriction (ḥaṣr), and limit (ghāyah). Divergent views among jurists regarding the probative force (ḥujjiyyah) or non-probativeness of some of these categories have also influenced domestic legal thought. Jurists and legal scholars consider certain types of mafḥūm mukhālafah to be probative while rejecting others. Careful scrutiny of the conditions for establishing the probative force of concepts such as sharṭ and waṣf reveals the jurists’ effort to ascertain a causal relationship (rābiṭah sababiyyah) between the ruling and the attached qualifier. This analytical approach can be generalized to other categories of mafḥūm mukhālafah as well. A comparative analysis of the role of qualification (qaydiyyat) in determining the probative force of mafḥūm mukhālafah in both Islamic jurisprudence and legal doctrine shows that, although foreign legal systems do not classify opposing meanings according to the traditional jurisprudential taxonomy, they nevertheless assign particular importance to the “cause-and-effect relationship” when evaluating the probative nature of an opposite meaning. Moreover, their approach relies more heavily on rational and logical reasoning than on literal interpretation. Accordingly, it appears that all forms of mafḥūm mukhālafah can be understood under a unified concept—mafḥūm al-qayd (the concept of qualification)—and that, in deriving the causal link between the ruling and the qualifier, one should rely on rational judgment (ḥukm ʿaqlī) along with historical and jurisprudential precedents.
Downloads
References
Abu Zahra, M. i. A. (1974). Usul al-Fiqh (Vol. 2). Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi.
Aghaee, K. (2014). Hermeneutical Schools of Interpretation in Law. Mizan Publications.
Akhound Khorasani, M. K. (1994). Kifayat al-Usul. Loghman Publications.
Al-Ansawi, J. a.-D. A. R. Nihayat al-Sul (Vol. 1). Muhammad Ali Sabih and Sons Press.
Al-Ghazali, M. Al-Mustasfa min 'Ilm al-Usul (Vol. 3). Islamic University.
Al-Sadr, S. M. B. (2005). Dorous fi 'Ilm al-Usul. Lebanese Book House.
Al-Sarakhsi, M. (1993). Usul al-Fiqh. Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah.
Al-Sharif, M. a.-M. (2014). Legal Logic. Enteshar Publishing Company.
Al-Subhani, J. f. (2011). Al-Mujaz fi al-Usul al-Fiqhi. Dar Ajwad al-A'immah.
Al-Zuhayli, W. (1985). Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (Vol. 1). Dar al-Fikr.
Drobnig, U. (2004). The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and -Property Law in Europe: A Comparative. Sellier. European Law Publishers.
Emami, S. H. (1987). Civil Law, Vol. 1, No. 6. Islamiya Publications.
Jafari Langarudi, M. J. f. (2003a). The Art of Argument: The Logic of Islamic Law. Ganj-e Danesh Publications.
Jafari Langarudi, M. J. f. (2003b). Legal Encyclopedia. Ganj-e Danesh Publications.
Jafari Tabar, H. (2004). The Philosophical Foundations of Legal Interpretation. Haydari Printing House.
Jansen, H. (2005). E contrario reasoning: The dilemma of the silent legislator. Argumentation, 19(4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-005-0526-7
Jansen, H. (2008). In view of an express regulation: Considering the scope and soundness of a contrario reasoning. Informal logic, 28(1). https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v28i1.513
Katouzian, N. (1998). Philosophy of Law (Vol. 3). Enteshar Publishing Company.
Katouzian, N. (2010). Civil Liability (Vol. 1). University of Tehran.
Khoei, A.-Q. (2007). Ghayat al-Ma'mul min Ilm al-Usul (Vol. 1). Islamic Thought Complex.
Macagno, F., Walton, D., & Sartor, G. (2017). Argumentation Schemes for Statutory Interpretation. The International Journal of Legal Discourse, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.1515/ijld-2017-0002
MacCormick, D. N., & Summers, R. S. (2016). Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315251882
Makarim Shirazi, N. (2011). Tariq al-Wusul ila Muhimmat 'Ilm al-Usul. Dar al-Nashr al-Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib.
Masjid Sarai, H., & Faiz, Z. (2016). An Introduction to the Concept of Mokhalef in the Interpretation of Legal Propositions. Quarterly Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence and Law Research, 12(4-5).
Mohaghegh Damad, S. M. (2005). Discussions on the Principles of Jurisprudence (Vol. 1). Islamic Sciences Publishing Center.
Mohammadi, A. (2007). Principles of Islamic Legal Inference. University of Tehran.
Musavi Khomeini, R. (1989). Sahifeh-ye Nur (Vol. 21). Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works.
Musavi Khomeini, R. (2002). Al-Tahdhib al-Usul (Vol. 2). Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works.
Nebbia, P. (2007). Unfair Contract Terms in European Law. Hart Publishing.
Prakken, H. (1997). Logical Models of Legal. Springer, Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5668-4
Rieg, A. (1979). Judicial Interpretation of Written Rules. Louisiana Law Review, 40(1).
Royakkers, L. (1998). Extending Deontic Logic for the Formalisation of Legal Rules. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9099-0_1
Shahabi, M. (2017). Philosophy of Law. Islamic Culture and Thought Research Institute.
Shahidi, M. (2013). Formation of Contracts and Obligations. Majd Publications.
Downloads
Published
Submitted
Revised
Accepted
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 رضا کریمی منفرد , قاسم محّمدی, سید ابوالقاسم نقیبی, منصور امینی (نویسنده)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
