Comparative Study of the Nature of Administrative Contracts in Iran and France

Abstract

The Iranian legal system, particularly in the field of administrative law, has been influenced by France. Accordingly, both in terms of structure and formal organization, as well as in substantive rules, Iranian administrative law can be regarded as largely derived from French administrative law. Administrative contracts are no exception to this influence. The debates among French legal scholars regarding the nature of administrative contracts can generally be categorized into three main theories: first, the theory of unity, which considers administrative contracts to be identical to private contracts; second, the theory of duality, which maintains that administrative contracts are fundamentally distinct from private contracts; and third, the mixed or hybrid theory, which suggests that administrative contracts share certain similarities with private contracts while differing in other respects (the quasi-contractual–quasi-legislative hypothesis). It appears that differences in the formation, execution, termination, and interpretation of administrative contracts, as compared to private contracts, support the independence of this branch of administrative law and justify its recognition even as a distinct academic discipline. The specific principles and specialized rules governing public services, as well as the formation, execution, termination, and interpretation of administrative contracts, have developed to such an extent that the proposition equating administrative contracts with private contracts can no longer be sustained. Nor can it be assumed that this branch of contract law simply follows the framework of private law and general contract principles. In this article, the authors, by presenting classical legal doctrines developed in France, attempt to delineate these differences and to address the critiques associated with them. The research method is descriptive–analytical.