Scope of Compensation in Tort Liability Arising from Bodily Injury, with Emphasis on Judicial Practice

Abstract

This article examines the scope of compensation in tort (non-contractual) liability arising from bodily injuries under Iranian law and compares it with contemporary legal systems. In Western legal systems and under the Iranian Civil Liability Act (Article 6), compensable bodily injury encompasses not only medical expenses and permanent physical impairment but also three categories of consequential and indirect loss: loss of the injured person’s working capacity and earning power (loss of future income); financial loss and deprivation of maintenance suffered by relatives and dependents (secondary or “ricochet” victims); and non-pecuniary damage suffered by surviving relatives. By contrast, under Islamic law and the current Iranian legal system, only diyah (or arsh) is prescribed as the fixed Sharia-based and statutory compensation for bodily offenses and injuries. The findings indicate that Imami jurists and the Iranian Islamic Penal Code (Articles 449–462, 567 et seq.) regard diyah as comprehensive and complete compensation for all losses arising from bodily injury, whether direct or indirect, and do not recognize separate compensation for loss of future income or the survivors’ loss of maintenance. The principal grounds for this approach are the comprehensive nature of diyah as compensation for loss of life or bodily integrity; the termination of the obligation to provide maintenance upon the death of the breadwinner; the rule that liability extends only to direct loss; and the existence of the deceased’s estate, including diyah, as a source of financial support for the heirs. Consequently, contemporary Iranian law contains two parallel yet inconsistent regimes: in the criminal law and diyah framework, diyah constitutes the sole form of compensation, whereas in the domain of civil liability, Article 6 of the Civil Liability Act appears to permit recovery of consequential losses. In practice, however, courts have issued divergent judgments because of the perceived conflict between such compensation and the Sharia rules governing diyah. Accordingly, this article seeks to examine the full range of divergent judicial approaches and to propose a comprehensive position capable of resolving this inconsistency.