An Optimal Criminal Policy Model for Reducing Construction Violations in the City of Mashhad

Abstract

Construction violations in metropolitan areas, particularly in the city of Mashhad, are not merely administrative or urban-planning irregularities; rather, they constitute a multidimensional phenomenon with legal, criminal, social, economic, environmental, and managerial consequences that may seriously challenge urban public order, citizens’ safety, public rights, and the requirements of sustainable development. The proliferation of unlicensed construction, unauthorized building extensions, unlawful changes of land use, encroachments upon public thoroughfares, and deviations from technical and safety regulations indicates that existing mechanisms for the prevention and control of such violations, despite their apparent breadth, lack the necessary effectiveness. Within the Iranian legal system, the principal mechanisms for addressing these violations are municipal regulations, particularly the Commission established under Article 100 of the Municipalities Law. However, practical experience demonstrates that the predominance of a fine-oriented approach, weaknesses in ex ante supervision, the absence of effective coordination among responsible institutions, ambiguity regarding the scope of professional liability of actors involved in construction activities, and the partial dependence of municipal revenues on fines imposed for construction violations have resulted in a situation in which many construction violations have not only failed to decline but, in some cases, have become low-cost and profitable conduct for offenders. The present study seeks to propose an optimal criminal policy model for reducing construction violations in the city of Mashhad. It employs a descriptive-analytical method and draws upon library-based sources, legal documents, jurisprudential and legal perspectives, and findings related to urban management. The principal research question is: What deficiencies characterize the existing criminal policy toward construction violations in Mashhad, and what model could provide greater effectiveness in preventing, controlling, and responding to such violations? The findings indicate that the existing policy is predominantly reactive, fragmented, revenue-oriented, and dependent on financial sanctions, while lacking adequate mechanisms for structural prevention, intelligent monitoring, and proportionate responses to violations that pose significant risks. Accordingly, the article proposes that the optimal model should be founded upon an integrated and preventive criminal policy. Such a model should incorporate situational prevention, continuous technical supervision, proportionate administrative and criminal responses, restrictions on converting hazardous construction violations into monetary fines, strengthened professional liability of engineers and building supervisors, enhanced interinstitutional coordination, reform of municipal revenue structures, and meaningful public participation by citizens. Such an approach may reduce incentives for committing construction violations, enhance the actual enforceability of building regulations, and strengthen good urban governance in Mashhad.