Conflict Between the Judge’s Knowledge and Other Means of Proof (Testimony, Oath, Confession, and Presumption)

Abstract

The primary research question is: in the event of a conflict between the judge’s knowledge and other means of proof, what are the criteria for precedence and preference, and how can a logical and fair balance be established between them? Furthermore, the question arises whether the judge’s knowledge can independently serve as the basis for issuing a verdict, or if it must always be considered alongside other evidence. The objective of this research is to analyze the status of the judge’s knowledge within the Iranian legal system and to determine its boundaries and limitations in opposition to traditional means of proof. This study seeks to provide a clear framework to assist judges and legal scholars in making reasoned and just decisions when encountering such conflicts. Additionally, a secondary objective of this research is to examine practical solutions, such as the utilization of expert opinions and the interpretation of evidence, to minimize conflicts and increase precision in the administration of justice. The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. Necessary data were collected through a review of library resources, including laws, regulations, jurisprudential and legal texts, scientific articles, and judicial precedents. Subsequently, by analyzing these data, the status of the judge’s knowledge in confrontation with other evidence was examined, and proposed solutions were presented. Research findings indicate that while the judge’s knowledge holds a unique position in the Iranian legal system, this status is not absolute. To accept the judge’s knowledge as independent evidence, conditions such as certainty, being documented (evidence-based), and being reason-based must be met. In cases where the judge’s knowledge does not reach the level of absolute certainty, other evidence, such as testimony (bayyinah) and confession, takes precedence. Furthermore, utilizing tools such as expert opinions can assist in strengthening the judge’s knowledge and reducing conflicts. Ultimately, this research emphasizes the necessity of creating a balance between the judge’s knowledge and other evidence to prevent the imposition of the judge’s personal opinion on the one hand, and to enable the discovery of the truth in complex cases on the other.