Criteria for Distinguishing a Just Judgment from an Unjust Judgment in the Iranian Legal System

Abstract

The distinction between a just and an unjust judgment constitutes one of the most fundamental challenges in the philosophy of law and judicial justice. This study aims to examine the criteria for identifying justice in judicial decisions and to establish both theoretical and practical benchmarks for distinguishing between just and unjust rulings. In the background and objective section, the author reviews the perspectives of classical philosophers and contemporary legal thinkers, addressing the central question of whether justice in judicial decisions is merely a formal and legal matter or whether it is rooted in broader moral values. This research adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology and employs an interdisciplinary approach, drawing upon jurisprudential, legal, and philosophical sources. The data are extracted from classical texts, including the works of Plato and Aristotle, as well as the theories of Islamic philosophers such as Al-Farabi and Mulla Sadra. These sources are then examined through conceptual analysis and comparative critique to explore the theoretical foundations of judicial justice. In addition, selected judicial decisions from various legal systems are analytically revisited to identify practical indicators of justice or injustice in rulings. The findings indicate that judicial justice cannot be achieved solely through formal compliance with the law; rather, it requires a profound understanding of the purpose of the law and the spirit of justice. A just judgment is one that, beyond formal conformity with legal provisions, embodies fairness, proportionality, and respect for human dignity. Ultimately, the article emphasizes the necessity of revising judicial processes so that, through the integration of legal and moral dimensions of justice, judgments may be issued that respond not only to the legal order but also to the moral conscience of society.